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Abstract
Drawn by globalization, Indonesia’s governance has been 
transformed into a more decentralised and democratically 
shaped one in the past decade. Given the scale of the challenges, 
its achievement deserves admiration. Yet, the remaining 
challenges, namely to ensure that decentralised democratic 
governance remains culturally deep-seated in Indonesia politics 
is enormous. The stage of the transformation has hardly reached 
the fundamentally required cultural change due to the lack of 
cultural understanding within the process of transformation. 
Since democratisation and decentralisation are, essentially, forms 
of cultural engagement of global political-economic powers, the 
article proposes to reframe those two processes as the kings of cultural 
transformation. Analysing along this line of thought allows us to 
uncover the fact of the stubborn obstacle that Indonesia has been 
facing to reconcile the intangible, yet, continuously-embedded 
clashes of sub-cultures. A kind of cross-cultural learning strategy 
is important for Indonesia to secure that agenda.
1  Presented at the International Conference on Malay Culture and Society: 
Evaluating Malay Culture in the Era of Globalization Organized by Universiti 
Brunei Darussalam, Bandar Seri Begawan, 3-5 November 2009.
2  Purwo Santoso is a proffessor in political science at Department of Politics 
and Government, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Gadjah 
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42 Globalisation is an inevitable challenge to any country on this 
planet.3 It drives most countries into transforming themselves toward 
decentralised systems of democratic governance. In this regard, what 
really matters is not to agree or to disagree with globalisation, but 
how deal with it.4 While the importance of a vigilant response is well 
understood, a strategic response is not easy to make. In attempting 
to understand the difficulty in making an appropriate response to 
that issue, this paper offers a reflective overview with special reference 
to the cases of decentralisation and democratisation in Indonesia. 
At issue here is that while globalisation’s role in bringing extensive 
exposure to externally induced processes of transformation is well 
understood, from my observation what is missing is an understanding 
of consolidated outward responses.   
This paper relies on anecdotal observation in arguing that 
globalisation is mainly a cultural process, even though its political 
and economic dimensions are apparent.5 A cultural lens in analyzing 
how a particular country engages in the process of globalisation allows 
us to uncover the importance of learning processes – from which 
Indonesia may benefit. The first part of this paper establishes a claim 
that globalisation is a cultural encounter. Judging from Indonesia’s 
response to globalisation it is clear that such a vision has not been 
adequately understood. 
Globalization as cross-cultural encounter
It is hardly an exaggeration to say that globalisation is marked 
by engagements among world-class political and economic players 
in global scale arena. It has been embedded in the trajectory of 
human history, at least since the colonial era. The recent popularity 
of the term ‘globalisation’ in the current discourse should not in any 
3 Manfred B. Steger; Globalism: The New Market Ideology, Rowman & 
Littlefield Publisher Inc., 2002.
4  There has been controversy not only in understanding the nature of the 
problem but also how to go about it. The sceptics respond to globalization 
with a deep suspicion, while globalization-minded wing sought to have a 
well-thought strategy to deal with. It opens up new opportunity, but at the 
same time, exposes a particular country to risks. In the worst case scenario, 
globalization could drift a country in a chaos or despair.
5 Ibid., Chapter 2.
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way deny the fact that the very practices that characterise today’s 
globalisation has been taking place for a long time. This process 
inevitably involves cultural encounters. Globalisation is a settlement 
of particular cultural practices through a series of instrumental 
changes. Through political and economic engagement, a certain 
cultural rearrangement takes place to the extent where a superior 
culture transforms the others. Globalisation, therefore, refers to a 
global-wide cultural transformation. 
Global power secures their roles by ensuring the participating 
players share the same cultural lens. International norms are 
produced and discursive processes are at play to allow hegemonic 
practice to prevail in favour of the world-class players who hold 
worldwide leverage. In order to have strategic engagement in the 
increasingly globalised world, each country needs to have the courage 
to clearly and critically evaluate and then define its own cultural lens. 
Otherwise, countries merely serve the global interests that often play 
out internally while these countries often remain unaware of this 
prevailing hegemony. 
In this context, it is fair to suggest that strategic responses and 
anticipation to globalisation should be culturally sensible to the 
given country where this process takes place. The problem then 
comes down to determining who are entitled to define which acts 
are culturally sensible and which are not. It is easy to say that each 
country is entitled to define what the sensible acts are and what are 
not. However, given the fact globalisation involves the reproduction 
of a certain social constructs any response to globalisation is going to 
be subject to a framing process undertaken by global players who have 
worldwide advantages. While it is desirable that each participating 
country be capable of defining what acts are deemed proper and 
what acts are not, it takes a great courage to ensure that frameworks 
which are globally set and nationally implemented are compatible to 
a particular cultural standard.
What sort of cultural arrangement does globalisation aim to 
settle? There is no doubt that globalisation carries liberal political ideas. 
Liberalism has provided the core values expressed in the application 
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44 and reproduction of norms, institutional setups, procedures, and so 
forth, on the worldwide scale. This idea goes along with a modern 
culture that is competitive and rationalistic. In the light of this 
globally expressed liberalism, individuality is not only highly valued 
but is also meant to be the anchor of social order.
As globalisation becomes more intensive and deepens its 
penetration, the format of the state is shifting. Once understood 
and functioned as a ‘collective self ’ representing the collectivity of 
its individual subjects, in many countries today the states have been 
losing its control over their individual subjects due to their relative 
effectiveness in expressing liberal order. Within this order, instead of 
being part of the collective self as represented by the state, individuals 
are instead encouraged to express themselves as autonomous agents 
capable of solving collective problems through voluntary exchanges, 
known to many as the market mechanism. 
The liberally shaped cultural lens is highly suspicious of the 
state’s potential abuse of power. Given the prevailing of liberalism 
in the ideological clash of the Cold War and its formation of a 
cultural lens,  democracy has been commonly understood as a matter 
of constraining the potential abuse of policy makers or the rulers. 
Such constraint has been pursued through the so-called  checks 
and balances mechanims, through which the civil society and other 
non-state actors are expected to be able to check state’s power and 
authority. In this regard, the more the culture is effectively reshaped 
within the template of globalisation, the further the ‘hollowing out’ 
of the state proceeds.
It is important to bear in mind that globalisation takes place 
always in a specific country with its specific context and situation. 
It means that, unless a country is willing to share the cultural lens 
mentioned above, globalisation actually is not taking place in that 
particular country. In almost every country, there have many studies 
that have deemed globalisation as being a cultural threat. Yet, studies 
in international relations have confirmed that power has remained 
the key independent variable in shaping modern international 
relations. More specifically, globalisation has not radically changed 
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fundamental aspects of international relations. It has merely altered 
the means and channels for exercising the power.6
As countries prepare to transform themselves aided with liberal-
cultural sensibility, a transnational process of transforming global 
governance is taking place. The outcome of such process, according 
to this line of thought, is that some sort of global consensus is 
resulting in the restructuring of the state. The liberal political culture 
is manifested in the advocacy of the growth of popular control in 
favour of preventing the state from abusing its power.
It is ironic that the globalisation process is currently hollowing 
the state since it was the very process that once prompted the 
establishment of the state — in the form that we know of today 
— across all parts of the globe. Developing countries, which mostly 
are post-colonial ones, inherited a particular form of polity known 
nowadays as the nation state through their colonial experiences. 
Colonialism shares various features, characteristics, and practices 
with present-day globalisation. The notion and practices of national 
state as a form of polity was transmitted from its birthplace in Europe 
to the other continents through colonialization process. However, 
the current development of globalisation has caused the state-centric 
mode of governance to lose its legitimacy in favour of its alternative 
– market-based governance. With regard to the notion of legitimacy, 
it is important to bear in mind that the distinction from legitimate 
to illegitimate action is from the view of a particular cultural lens.
A country makes a sensible respond to globalisation through a 
particular lens. The kind of response it makes depends on the cultural 
lens it uses to perceive its world. There is, therefore, a strong need 
to have a clear lens and a sound basis for engaging in the cultural 
encounter and coming to terms with globalisation. The absence of 
a cultural lens makes the response to globalisation arbitrary and 
unpredictable. The response might take different shapes, but those 
responds come out of particular cultural lens. Apparently, a country’s 
ability to make a strategic response to globalisation — in this case 
6 Sean Kay; “Globalization, Power, and Security”, Security Dialogue Vol. 35, No. 
1, March 2004.
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cultural lens.
Globalisation affects each country by continuously reshaping 
the cultural lens it uses  to perceive the world and its existence in 
it. Hypothetically, the reshaping process of values, norms, rules is 
no longer required when all those who participant within the global 
governance share exactly the same cultural lens. This might never 
come about in the real world. Nonetheless, looking at it in this way 
helps us to understand that it is the cultural lens in a given country 
that defines whether globalisation is to be successfully implemented 
in that country. The matching of cultural lens adopted worldwide 
with the lens adopted by a particular country allows the country to 
embark on the transformation process simply for the sake of global 
interest.
Globalisation essentially is a process to ensures that the national 
cultural lens is compatible with — if not exactly the same to — 
the one used by other countries who serve as ideal models. For this 
reason, this paper will examine to what extent Indonesia has had a 
clear cultural lens for embarking on the massive reformation process 
in the aftermath of Suharto’s presidency. Two tiers of transformation 
— namely democratisation and decentralisation — have taken place 
since then. The question is: ‘What has driven the transformation?’ 
To answer this, we need to find out whether it has been in response 
to internal problems in Indonesia, such as cultural diversity and 
the size of its territory etc, or to conform with the prevailing global 
governance. Or has Indonesia been dedicated to both of them. In 
other words, has the response to globalisation been a panic or a smart 
move?
What do previous findings tell us? Many things have undergone 
changes under the banner of globalisation. Yet, whether these 
changes receive public acceptance depends on how wider public 
affected by those changes respond to those changes. This process is 
basicaly political as indicated by the widespread of politics of culture 
that has been prevailing in all countries.7 Moreover, understanding 
7 Kirk S. Kidwell; ‘Politics, Performativity, Autopoiesis: Toward a Discourse 
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globalisation as a politically critical cultural transformation is 
imperative. Encountering globalisation is essentially an experience in 
managing cultural change. It could be pro-active as well as reactive. 
To follow this argument, this paper treats democratisation and 
decentralisation — considered necessary in this globalised world — 
as a cultural matter.
Democratisation and decentralisation are, among others, good 
examples of the changing character of means and channels being 
used by various actors in exercising their power. In the name of 
democracy and autonomy, new means and channels are introduced 
and shared all over the world, and these eventually reshape the global 
mode of governance. At this point, there is a double-edged cultural 
transformation. On the one hand, pre-disposition to particular 
style of democracy in each nation state leads to the formation of 
the so-called cosmopolitan democracy.8 On the other hand, the 
formation of context-specific models of democracy with the advance 
of global democracy continues to persist in each country, unless it 
unconditionally surrenders to the externally – imposed standards.9
In keeping global-wide governance in order, a governing principle 
is required. One among others is the concept of cosmopolitan 
democracy. Despite cosmopolitan democracy is being subject 
to severe criticism10, it is important to note that it has relatively 
managed to establish hegemony.11 For example, in an attempt to 
adopt and adapt to the norms established within the banner of 
cosmopolitan democracy, globalisation eventually has managed to 
alter the way we understand democracy. We no longer treat it merely 
as a set of norms, but also an appropriate process dealing with public 
affairs.12 On the name of democracy each country engenders ‘new 
Systems Theory of Political Culture’, in Studies ↔ Critical Methodologies, Volume 
9 Number 4, August 2009 533-558.
8 Daniele Archibugi, ‘Cosmopolitan Democracy and its Critics: A Review’, in 
European Journal of International Relations 2004; 10; 437
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Allen Chun, ‘Globalization as Indigenization, or the Culture in Taiwanese 
National Politics’, in Journal of Asian and African Studies, 2000; 35; 7
12 Daniele Archibugi,op. cit.
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and communities,13 thus, engaging in globalisation, therefore, means 
allowing each nation state to undermine its own base of power. 
Democracy, within the mainstream interpretation of globalisation, 
“...erodes states’ political autonomy and thereby curtails the efficacy 
of state-based democracy”.14
The shifting conceptualisation of democracy – which is no 
longer state-based — renders the idea of decentralisation irrelevant. 
The discourse of decentralisation was once attached to the internal 
transformation within a state. As the increasingly globalised framework 
has become more prominent, the concept of decentralisation has 
also shifted. A new concept, namely decentralised governance, 
is on offer.15 Some significant ideas are conveyed in this concept: 
1) the primacy of the cultural element, including in institutional 
arrangements to deal with public affairs at the local level; 2) no 
matter how local the arrangement might be, it is always suppossed 
to be directly in play with the dynamics of global governance. The 
mainstream interpretation is that the locals — be they state agencies, 
mass-based organisations or businesses — interact intensively in the 
international arena within the least possible constraint from the state.
Apparently, globalisation appears to be the transformation of 
the mode of governance upon which a market-based global political 
and economic order comes to play. As the state-based mode of 
governance is on the retreat and simultaneously the market-based 
mode is gaining prominence, the business-corporate entity enjoys 
more prominent and powerful role. In the name of cosmopolitan 
democracy, a set of cosmopolitan social standards are put in place. 
There has been a regime of truth in formation, along with its 
international legal instruments. Nonetheless, commonly acceptable 
form of accountability has been absence.16 Unreliability of global 
13 Daniele Archibugi,op. cit.
14 Daniele Archibugi,op. cit.
15 G. Shabbir Cheema, Dennis A. Rondinelli (eds); Decentralizing Governance 
: Emerging Concepts and Practices, Ash Institute For Democratic Governance 
And InnovationHarvard University, Washington, 2007.
16 David Held, ‘Globalization, Corporate Practice and Cosmopolitan Social 
Standards’, in Contemporary Political Theory, 2002, 1, (59–78).
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economic accountability and social justice justify each nation 
in applying its own cultural lens in encountering the prevailing 
globalism.
The globally accepted idea of democracy is the one which is 
derived from liberal political philosophy. From a theoretical stand 
point, the term ‘democracy’ does not necessarily take the shape of 
the liberal form.17 Yet, given the hegemonic nature of discourse on 
this issue we are easily dragged into the predominantly liberal stream. 
Bearing this in mind, it is important to declare that this paper has no 
intention to neither deny nor advocate liberalism as the governing 
principle of globalisation. It treats liberalism as the setting of inevitable 
process of transformation a country needs. Nonetheless, for the sake 
of preparing the cultural ground to engage in a continuous learning 
process within the predominantly liberalised world, it is important to 
make some important propositions.
First, no matter what ideological standing a country wishes 
to take, good governance requires a strong cultural grounding that 
significantly contributes to the corresponding country’s ability to 
express it consistently. Cultural transformation could take place 
through a process of interpretation and internalisation. By doing 
so, the existing cultural beliefs would be enriched and revitalised. 
A good example of cultural transformation through interpretation 
and internalisation was in the formation of Indonesian nationalism, 
given that previously the people of the ‘Indonesian’ archipelago had 
lived in small kingdoms, sultanates, or tribes prior to colonialisation. 
Failure to adapt in such a way would lead to cultural colonisation 
or subjugation, as it was for the people under the  rule of a central 
colonial government in Batavia and, still further, Netherland. In 
the context of transforming a country into having democratic and 
decentralised governance, the country has to critically interpret 
and internalise things it deems culturally valuable. This is the point 
where understanding on how Indonesia understands democracy and 
17 Stephen C. Angle, “Decent Democratic Centralism”, Political Theory, Vol. 
33 No. 4, August 2005 518-546. Se also Martin Leet; “Democracy and the 
Individual Deliberative and existential Negotiations”; Philosophy & Social 
Criticism,  vol. 29 no 6, pp. 681–702
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Second, the transformation through cultural learning requires a 
certain degree of confidence. Eagerness to learn from other cultures 
should be safeguarded by cultural awareness of its own. Overvaluing 
the predominantly liberalised mode of governance would show a fair 
indication toward a the lack of confident in its own culture. Such an 
overvaluation in an absence of cultural framework would potentially 
lead to adoption of an eclectic mode of governance. This might be 
desirable but would be deemed to be a failure if it had no means of 
reconciling contradictory demands. In this regard, it is noteworthy 
that uncritically engaging in transformation toward liberalism may 
lead to entrapment in various contradictions.
Third, liberal format of governance is very seductive. Yet, 
adopting such a format requires particular attitudes. That form 
of governance — manifest, for example, in the function of 
opposition—equips itself with capacity to engage in a continuous 
learning process. Expression of individual freedom (or liberty, rather) 
— the very foundation of liberalism —raises the chance of conflicts. 
Interestingly, liberalism has survived and even gained popularity due 
to its capability in managing conflicts. Moreover, the liberal format 
of governance equips itself with the capacity to learn by the way of 
transforming contradictions into dialectic. Progress through dialectic 
engagement, however, leaves serious potential shortcoming. Such 
engagement eventually, places the public into the hands of those who 
win the competition and potentially disregard those who lose or fail.
Four, learning cultural practices is beyond anyone’s 
comprehension. This is because learning processes is inherent within 
the daily cultural engagement itself. Supposedly, the learning process 
should be thoroughly conducted by someone through research, and 
the problems to learn from and the lesson obtained should be deeply 
shared by the public. Otherwise, the learning process would end up 
merely with a report, instead of being geared toward the process of 
transformation. The tricky process of cultural learning is that people 
are normally attracted to appearance, including artefacts. Moreover, 
learning from the apparent appearance actually is the least important 
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one. The most important — and also the most difficult — one is 
learning cultural values. With regards to the topic of this paper, liberal 
values, which are the very much founded in the globalised mode of 
governance, are actually hidden beneath observable behaviours or 
activities.
In trouble with globalisation: The absence of cultural sensitivity
Democratisation and decentralisation are matters of state 
transformation in a culturally sensible way. Indeed, they are a matter 
of reshaping the prevailing power structure from time to time. Hence, 
democratisation and decentralisation involve a constant process of 
changes
The search for a suitable format of governance in Indonesia has 
been troubled by pragmatism. This is apparent from its unwillingness 
to learn from history and to analyze an issue from its cultural 
perspective. In fact, globalised discourse has gone unchallenged 
simply because following globalisation has been considered as 
following the most up-to-date trends. On the other hand, the 
prevailing global players have been struggling to actively set the global 
trend. Uncritical acceptance and adoption of the developing trend 
has tended to direct our focus on the question of ‘What do we lack 
to fit the idealised ongoing trend?’, instead “What are the underlying 
logic and power relations which have comprised the structure of the 
corresponding trend. Thus, it is hardly a surprise to see Indonesia as 
a country constantly more preoccupied with its internal affairs. This 
will be elaborated in the following sections.
Unacquainted to the cultural ground of the state
The basic format of governance in each country, including 
Indonesia, has been the idea of nation state. It is also known as the 
‘Westphalian’ model of state. It emerged from European history, 
and then was actively propagated by European countries — colonial 
rulers — to other parts of the world. Through colonialism Europeans 
were able to apply the Westphalian mode of governance within their 
respective colonies.
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problems, yet the idea of the Westphalian nation state has persisted 
throughout the histories of the post-colonised states. In this regard, 
the search for proper governance in Indonesia requires a certain 
degree of understanding about the legacy of Dutch colonial rule. The 
Westphalian model was invented to set a stable settlement among 
the conflicting powers in Europe in the 17th Century. As the setting 
of the globalised world has changed, so too has the design of the 
state. In the recent wave of globalisation, the former colonial rulers 
have reshaped their own model of governance. They have changed 
from a better understanding that what they needed was not merely to 
end wars but, more importantly, to share collective progress through 
transnational cooperation. The consolidation that has occurred far 
has and been manifested in the institutionalisation of the European 
Union (EU). A prototype for a transnational state has been put in 
place.
This is not a historical study and, therefore, does not present 
engage itself with historical explanation here. Historical matters 
are briefly discussed merely to suggest that the current wave of 
globalisation must be understood in its connection with the 
unsettled implant of the idea of nation state. The Dutch coloniser 
had to engage in many encounters with various nationalities when it 
attempted to establish the Dutch East Indie. This project later on was 
taken over by the Indonesia nationalist movement, especially with the 
idea of nation state that is basically meant one state for each nation. 
Each nationality that comprises Indonesia has a particular cultural 
setup. The nation state of Indonesia is, essentially, transnational – 
and, therefore, equivalent to the EU. Unlike the institutionalisation 
of EU, which is bottom-up in its character, institutionalisation of 
Indonesia has been otherwise. This fact leaves perennial deep-seated 
discontents rarely expressed. This paper will not outline the important 
lessons that can be drawn from this case. 
Firstly, decentralisation is intended to pay respect to the cultural 
basis of each locality. This is contrary to the common understanding 
and practice of decentralisation in Indonesia, which proceeds with 
a top-down process. Nordholt and van Klinken (2007) mentioned 
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that decentralisation in Indonesia  has been basically understood 
by the main actors involved, including International Monetary 
Fund and World Bank, as merely a financial administrative project. 
Confirming Hadiz,18 they argued that such a perspective blurred the 
other reality of struggle for power among various actors both at the 
national and local level.19
Secondly, decentralisation is a cultural affair in contrast to the 
prevailing discourse in Indonesia which treats decentralisation as an 
administrative –bureaucratic process. The failure to understand this 
unsettled nature of the nation state in Indonesia hypothetically links 
to the difficulty of the country to pursue  the trajectory of globalised 
governance of – democratisation and decentralisation. Endless 
debates over democracy versus authoritarianism or a decentralised 
versus centralised format of governance have been taking place on the 
basis of a prevailing notion of the nation state. What does that mean? 
In thinking about appropriate formats of governance for Indonesia, 
we easily forget the following things: 
1) The proper format of governance within the mind of the people 
is not necessarily consistent with the very idea of national state;
2) The Indonesian encounter with, and long-drawn-out usage of, 
the concept of nation state allows us to have a false impression 
that the only way to make Indonesia governable is through the 
development of a nation state. Moreover, if the very foundation of 
Indonesia as a nation state is found to be culturally ungrounded, 
the currently available framework for comprehending and 
conducting transformation is subject to reformulation. 
3) There is a need to democratise and decentralise the mode of 
governance which, at the same time, would overcome the 
overdue process of mending the nation state. Apparently, there 
is no urgency to go back to the original design of nation state. 
The problems that are caused as a result, however, need to be 
18  Hadiz, Vedi R. quoted in Nordholt, Henk Schulte and Gerry van Klinken. 
“Pendahulan” in Nordholt, Henk Schulte and Gerry van Klinken (eds.), 2007, 
Politik Lokal di Indonesia, Jakarta: KITLV and YOI, p.21
19  Ibid
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Related to Nordholt and van Klinken’s statement mentioned 
above, academic analysis based on the technocratic perspective of 
governance in Indonesia has tended to take Indonesia as a nation state 
for granted, or at least no longer questioned it. The predominance 
of the legalistic-administrative understanding that has been well in 
place in the country since the declaration of the independence in 
1945 has left small or no room for revisiting Indonesia as a nation 
state. The patriotic perspective, presupposing that the state was 
born through independence from colonial rule on 17 August, 1945, 
conceals an alternative understanding that, no matter how important 
the day of the declaration, the people’s daily lives retain legacies from 
the past including their particular view of nation-hood. The patriotic 
proposition, denying any involvement of colonial rule in shaping the 
state, fails to recognise that the colonial framework is retained within 
the very practices of Indonesia as an independent modern state. 
Even the very idea of Indonesia as nation state was actually taken 
from colonial cultural politics by the activists of the independent 
movement. Through politics of language, namely facilitated by the 
Malay language (bahasa Melayu) as a lingua franca, was conducted 
by the Dutch colonial for uniting the country’s vast diversity.20 
Despite the denial by the patriotic lens, much of the colonial mode 
of governance, including the operation of modern bureaucracy, 
has been adopted by the later independent Indonesia. Culturally 
speaking, the legal birth date of the state does not necessarily mean 
immediate cultural rupture, either of the colonial or the traditional 
one. 
At issue here is that the nation state of Indonesia is different from 
most nation states in Europe. In most European countries, the idea 
implies that one nation has one state – a state for each nationality. In 
the Indonesian context, there are at least two layers of nation. The first 
is the so-called civic-based nationalism. In this regard, nationalism 
refers to the existence of Indonesia as a collective imagination of 
20  See Anderson, B.R.O.G, 2006, Imagined Communities: Reflection on the Origin 
and Spread of Nationalism, London: Verso, first published by Verso in 1983  
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various ethnic groups, religious communities, or localities within the 
territory. Discourse of the nation state usually refers to this type of 
nationalism and, hence, we might call this ‘national nationalism’. 
The crucial point here is to stress that even though this type of 
nationalism is all encompassing of ethnicity, religious affiliation and 
local identities, it is still in formation. The second layer of nationalism 
has a narrower scope, uniting the collective imaginations of each 
ethnic group, religious community, or local adherence. Nonetheless, 
this sort of nationalism is undoubtedly powerful and effective in 
consolidating collective or concerted actions. Moreover, even though 
national nationalism is attached to the state, the narrower type is 
capable to subvert the state. During the New Order period, this 
allowed for subversion which frustrated the regime. The pejorative 
term frequently used often  by government official statements and 
in school class activities — of nasionalisme sempit — came to signify 
the power of society to challenge the state through cultural means. 
The new-born state of Indonesia was positioned on top of a fragile 
national nationalism in the sense that it remained potentially in 
conflict with other forms of nationalism.
It is important to note that awareness of the fragility of the 
structure of Indonesia as a nation state was deeply felt in the early 
post-independence era. This was evident in at least in two ways. 
Firstly, the founding fathers actively reproduced an old slogan, 
Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (Unity in Diversity), as the guiding principle 
for dealing with the issue of diversity. It signifies an imagined ideal of 
the Indonesia nation state, where on the one hand, it is expected to be 
able to establish itself as a nation-wide system while, at the same time, 
allowed for diversity to flourish among its subjects. The paradoxical 
situation was very clear in the minds of the founding fathers, although 
resolving this paradox has proved to be more difficult. This would 
explain why the slogan was incorporated into Indonesia’s national 
Coat of Arms. Secondly, Sukarno, the first Indonesian president, 
embarked on what he himself called nation building. One of the 
important issues was overcoming issues of ethnic parochialism, 
which undeniably prevailed and, at some point, hindered the proper 
function of government. Local values and sentiments have continued 
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has officially aimed to ensure.
There are two issues of governance which need careful attention. 
Firstly, there is the problem in the relationship between statehood 
and nationhood. The inability to establish a synergetic relationship 
between the two, and to distinguish between them, leads to failure in 
governance. Nationwide statehood, which relies on the function of 
bureaucracy and technocracy, should seriously take into account the 
coexisting cultural practices of governance. Otherwise, the existing 
cultural practices might continuously present themselves as potential 
threat of subvertion for the operation of the state. 
The second problem is the appearance of government. 
Governance processes take place both in the formal and informal 
domain. Beneath the formality of the process lays a dense and 
complex network operating according to the cultural norms in place. 
For proper or appropriate governance, Indonesia inevitably has to 
deal with these two issues. Our search for proper or appropriate 
governance would be loosely grounded, if culturally uprooted, unless 
these two issues were well incorporated. This, unfortunately, has not 
been the case.
Indonesia has been understood as a ‘weak state’ and has ranked 
within the category of ‘warning’ in the Failed State Index 2012.21 
This is ironic because it is endowed with cultural power concentrated 
on various cultural entities. The state has been uneasy — not to 
say unable — in disciplining itself. The state consistently faces 
difficulties in implementing its own policies given the inconsistency 
of its normative grounds to govern. For example, citizenship is often 
in conflict with kinship. Normatively, the state is responsible for 
serving the public on the basis of citizenship. This is grounded on 
the idea of civic nationalism. However, in practice it is difficult for 
the agents of the state bureaucracy to live up to this principle of 
modern state. This is their multiple positions as subject. Besides as 
state bureaucrats, many of them also belong to certain sub-national 
21  Failed State Index 2012, The Fund for Peacehttp://www.fundforpeace.org/
global/?q=fsi-grid2012, Saturday, June 31, 2012, 11.22pm
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social formation based on different kinds of membership, including 
kinship. In their day to day activities as state’s bureaucrats, they often 
face dilemmatic situation of divided loyalties. In the one hand, as 
state’s bureaucrats they are required to treat every citizen equally 
regardless their cultural and kinship backgrounds. As member of 
their respective kinship groups, however, they are obliged to favor 
their fellow kinship members or they might face social punishment 
from their respective communities. In this situation, the commonly 
solution taken by bureaucrats is to give priority to relatives and hide 
the evidence of discriminative practice administratively.
The point here is not merely that the state apparatus weakens 
the state itself for cultural reasons, but to show that the capacity of 
cultural power to keep the state in check. Interestingly, the power 
has been at play silently – even beyond the country’s experts in the 
field of governance studies. This is the basis for setting up modes of 
governance in Indonesia and, hence, explains why democracy and 
decentralisation remain problematic issues. There is good reason to 
suspect that the problem is rooted due to the absence of the cultural 
dimension within the studies and discourses on democratisation and 
decentralisation. The following section attempts to probe this matter 
by reviewing the discourse.
The most important practice is in making an appropriate 
category. This paper has introduced various ways of devising 
categories: statehood versus nationhood; formal versus informal 
governance; strong versus weak state, etc. The failure to make a clear 
and consistent category indicates the lack of mastery in responding 
to external challenges and pressure.  Other countries or players easily 
control weaker countries by imposing their own category labels. 
Evaluating through this yardstick raises a deep concern. Public 
discourses are easily trapped into categories that are not culturally 
grounded.
Discourse on democracy and decentralisation in Indonesia 
has been naïve in assuming that Indonesia as a nation state is no 
longer affected by inherited cultural problems that prevent it from 
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country is an unfinished agenda. Unless the public shares a strong 
sense of urgency to do so, Indonesia is actually committed to 
globalisation in a reversed way. It leaves to global forces — which 
have been penetrating the country through the prevailing discursive 
engagement — to decide on the direction Indonesia should take. The 
nation state has been transforming itself in adapting to the globalised 
world. What Indonesia fails to do is to identify solid and well-placed 
stepping stones to ease the future challenges of globalisation.
To my observation, the cultural context has not been well 
thought out, especially among political scientists in this country. This 
has resulted in the stepping stones being unreliable. The community 
of Indonesian intellectuals have rarely, if ever, made use of a cultural 
lens in their analysis and, hence, have failed to prevent cultural 
imperialism. Despite being such an enlightened section of society, 
it is basically unaware of the hidden practice known as ‘academic 
imperialism’, ‘orientalism’ or ‘euro centrism’, and fails to connect its 
own cultural basis with the globalising world.
Believing that public discourse potentially frames social 
practice, the absence of a cultural lens allows democratisation and 
decentralisation to occur at odds with cultural practices. This leads 
to two simultaneous situations. Firstly, the discourse and the practice 
fail to grasp the problems. Secondly, it overstates the perceived 
success. These problems are the subjects of the following section.
Not framing but framed by global crisis
Democratisation and decentralization in post-Suharto 
Indonesia seems to be misplaced since it has been grounded on false 
assumptions. This leads to the failure to grasp the discrepancies of 
the implementation of those two processes as discursive practice. 
This situation is indicated one among other is by the persistency 
of many jargons produced and used during the era of Soekarno’s 
Guided Democracy that are still in use today, mostly as ungrounded 
assumptions. For example, though the fact that the current mode of 
22  Nordholt and van Klinken, op.cit
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governance was not satisfactory, there has been eagerness to relate 
it with its basis, namely nation state understood as an integralistic 
entity. This particular view of the state perceives the multiple and 
diverse ethnic, religious, and cultural groups as reminisence of 
historical past that has transformed themselves and should transform 
themselves as merely passive elements of the new and broader 
entity of Indonesia nation represented by the state at the center. 
Such view neglects the fact that these particular groups retain their 
particular point of view and way of life as particular entities. The 
persistency to initiate democratization and decentralization based on 
the assumptions mentioned in the previous paragraph leads to the 
situation where there is overstatement of the capacity of the nation 
state. This takes place simultaneously with the use of formalistic lens 
through which informal governance is missed out despite its strength 
in cultural sense. 
The second situation that put Indonesia’s cultural grounds in 
engaging with the globalised order into a test is its ability to identify and 
respond to discursive power that is concealed beneath the practices of 
daily life. The country had not been able to settle fundamental issues 
beneath the surface of democratisation and decentralisation. This 
explains why democratisation and decentralisation has periodically 
appeared in the contemporary history of Indonesia. Radical changes 
have been taken at certain points, but on these occasions the formation 
of new consensus in response has determined that the direction taken 
was wrong. The consequence of this is apparent – namely, repeated 
returns to the beginning. This would indicate that something very 
fundamental has been falsely addressed.
In terms of democratisation, there was pressure and even 
attempts to adopt liberal democracy not long after independence. 
The legacy of the attempt is referred to as era demokrasi liberal (liberal 
democracy era). This term was used in derogatory sense during the 
eras of Soekarno’s Guided Democracy and Suharto’s authoritarian 
era to discredit the choice or adherence to a liberal institutional 
design. Interestingly, since the authoritarian rule of Suharto broke 
down, the country has returned to the former liberal democratic 
setup. Similarly to previous liberal periods in the 1950s, the post-
Cross-cultural Learning for Seceuring Deceentralization ...
60 New Order era of liberal democracy has also been one for launching 
decentralisation on a massive scale.
The fact that the issues have appeared, disappeared, and then 
reappeared would indicate that Indonesia has not been able to 
culturally settle and resolve them. At issue here is not necessarily 
the rejection to the ideas of democracy or autonomy derived from 
decentralisation, but concerns on the institutional arrangement and 
ability to convey these ideas in the real context – which is certainly 
a diverse and constantly changing one. This paper has no interest 
in defending authoritarianism. Democratisation was brought about 
as if it was like computer software being installed. The elites who 
promote democracy, precisely liberal democracy, imagine that 
democratisation is a matter of introducing sets of organisation and 
procedural arrangements. They practically do not bother to check 
whether the public thinks and acts according to the liberal mindset. 
The miss-match between the institutional or procedural setup and 
the mindset of the public leaves democratic practice as ambivalent.
Given the fact that the state has been weak, discourse on 
decentralisation turns out to be misleading. Why? Whether the 
authority of the state is decentralised, locals have been able to find 
their own way to manage their problems. Locals have various way 
of hijacking the state’s power. Culturally speaking, locals have not 
been desperate for local power as it is commonly thought. The 
public in Indonesia is consolidated along cultural and religious 
affiliations, and to some extent these are self-governing. Whether the 
state decentralises its mode of governance, there is a self-governing 
capacity in practice which is difficult for the state to ignore. The 
problem, which is apparently taken seriously from the legalistic-
administrative point of view, is that the governing process takes place 
within an informal domain, relying on informal actors. In essence, 
decentralisation is a willingness to acknowledge the fact that the 
prevailing mode of informal governance is a legitimate practice.
The reluctance to acknowledge the existence and functioning of 
culturally-rooted and locally-based modes of governance gives a false 
impression that decentralisation has caused problems at the local 
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level. Indeed, local power works in accordance with its own logic 
and its own interpretation of what is the proper thing to do. In this 
respect, decentralisation should be perceived as a reliance on local 
power in dealing with public affairs. This is what decentralisation is 
all about. It becomes a problem-creating policy because it is seen from 
the perspective of those who have been accustomed to centralised 
mode of governance. Essentially, these figures are uneasy in dealing 
with diversity, and unable to see things from the local perspective.
The global financial crisis in East Asia and Southeast Asia during 
the mid 1990s resulted in the economic crisis and then political crisis 
in Indonesia. This crisis undermined the legitimacy in the institutional 
design of the authoritarian New Order state. Deep crisis, as policy 
studies have recognised, provides wide opportunity to embark on 
radical change. This was the case in terms of democratisation and 
decentralisation. From that point on, much legislation has been 
produced with the aim of liberalise the country’s political and economic 
structures. Such legislation has come to regulate previously sensitive 
issues including elections, political parties, local government, the 
press, and so on. In the wake of enthusiastic changes, constitutional 
change also took place to legally signify them. 
Democratisation and decentralisation: Loosely grounded reform
Unlike Europeans who have consolidated their existing states 
under the broader banner of the EU, Indonesia has done the 
reverse. As the country has returned to the framework of liberal 
democracy, simultaneous with the initiation of decentralization 
policy, there has also been strong demands from the locals to have 
their own autonomous local governments. Thus, the number of local 
governments has almost doubled within only a decade. This has been 
a manifestation of an inward-looking cultural lens. 
In order to see the cultural lens employed in the country, there are 
two important things to note. First, the process faced is understood 
as a domestic process which rather neglects the contribution of 
global financial governance. The predominant discourse which 
unites public debate gives the impression that the main problem was 
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a centralistic mode of governance. The perspective that sees market-
based governance — as the thrust behind globalised governance — 
as the primary force that led this country into serious turbulence, has 
never risen to the surface. This could be called as public blindness 
– something taken advantage of by a number of politically motivated 
actors.
The second noteworthy thing is that a deep hatred toward 
Suharto has provided strong confidence in the combined effort for 
democratisation and decentralisation project as the only way to go. 
Moreover, this enthusiasm has left behind a strong impression that 
whatever asassociated with Suharto was bad, even though in reality 
people could not easily disassociate themselves from it.
Within the light of this changing discourse, democratisation and 
decentralisation sit as among the most important issues for Indonesia. 
Since a proper response to globalisation requires a strong local basis 
and, at the same time, aims to have a strategic role in the global 
arena, the prevailing legal and institutional arrangement should be 
subject to investigation. Reading the Act on decentralisation and 
local governance would provide us with some basis to uncover the 
cultural lens taken by Indonesia.
Central-local relationship 
The first post-Suharto law specifically designed to push for 
decentralised democracy was the Act No. 22 of 1999. This law was 
officially implemented in 2000. This Act set Indonesia on the path 
to radical change in that central government was treated like a federal 
government, rendered to being responsible for issues common to 
federal authorities – for example, defense, foreign policy, and the 
judiciary. The Act officially declared that most of the state’s authority 
would be redistributed to regency or municipal governments. To 
protect this arrangement, the Act also determined that provincial 
governments were different sets of local government. It became 
no longer  the place or chanell through which the regencies of 
municipalities take instruction from the central government.
An observation from this change is that consciousness of 
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Indonesia’s diversity has made the Act implicitly adopt federalism. 
This was a brave attempt given that the perception of federalism 
as something divisive against national unity was still strong in 
Indonesian public’s opinion and an institutional framework to unite 
the country did not exist. While federalism has offered a framework 
to govern cultural diversity, it has not adequately addressed the 
‘uniting’ factor. It could be argued that the Act was not well thought 
through. Inter-regional discrepancies, such as the different levels of 
economic development and the absence of infrastructure in some 
remote parts of the country, were not taken into account. It turned 
out that despite the broad autonomy given to the local government 
under this act the west-edge and the east-edge parts of the country 
retained their discontent, and continued in struggling for different 
treatment. Later on, these two provinces managed to obtain special 
arrangement. Special autonomy laws for Papua and, some time later, 
for Aceh were enacted. What does this tell us? 
Firstly, federalism, which has been a readily available framework 
implemented elsewhere in the world, was inssufficient either. Careful 
and prolonged negotiations which took place one by one apparently 
consolidated a new understanding, then known as asymmetric 
decentralisation. Decentralisation was initially — and still officially 
— understood as a single design applicable for all. Moreover, it is 
perceived toproceed from the ‘top’ level to the ‘bottom’ (top-down). 
Within this framework of decentralization, apparently, it would 
be less likely to work through negotiation and  to seriously take 
into account the differences. Unfortunately, the experiences of the 
regions like Aceh and Papua that manage to negotiate their terms 
for special arrangement might tell other regions that for negotiation 
to take place between the central government and the locals, armed 
movement is necessary.
Second, transferring the state’s authority from the Jakarta-
based central government to each regency and municipality was a 
sympathetic idea for Indonesia. What was missing was an appropriate 
process for carrying it out. The Act did not provide any idea on how 
to achieve such a wonderful idea. Moreover, the imagination that 
decentralisation was a matter of transferring authority was deceiving. 
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not so much been about the attribution of authority to the local 
level, but how to make the authority function in order to serve the 
public. In other words, the trouble in decentralising governance was 
to match formal authority with informal types which already existed. 
The mismatch between formal and informal authority has potentially 
to underperformance — if not dysfunction — in local governance. 
Obviously, pretending that informal authority was not previously in 
existence, and pretending that the administrative approach as was the 
only process  that takes place place, would not only be deceiving but 
also potentially disastrous for decentralisation and democratisation. 
Empowering local legislature
The other point set out by the Act was that the local legislature 
became no longer part of local government. Instead, it became very 
powerful in its own right, and this change happened in a sudden. This 
was the institution to whom the heads of local government (Regents, 
Majors or Governors) were held accountable for their policies and 
decisions. An important observation on this particular issue would 
be that the expectation that the local-level legislatures would be 
instantly empowered and work positively for democratizing local 
governance just simply because the Act said so, was awfully naïve. 
Unfortunately, that was not the case in majority local governments 
in Indonesia. With the huge power in its hand to elect or depose 
a head of local governement, the local parliament turned itself 
into another actor in the intricate web of power brokery, involving 
practices such as money politics, extortion, fraud, and many others. 
Instead of reducing the extent and degree of dirty political practices 
previously associated with Soeharto’s New Order, the empowerment 
of local legislature through this act rather extensified the scope and 
intensified the degree of those practices.   
Overstate Superficial Achievement.
To counter balance the critical account on what has occurred, 
it is important to point out to the fact that Indonesia has been 
enjoying international recognition for its ability to sustain the ‘big-
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bang model’ of democratisation in tandem with decentralisation. 
Judgment on the success on this matter, however, has been based 
on superficial aspects. Success in democratisation has been, in this 
regard, been oversimplified by success in conducting general elections 
with tolerable degrees of violence. Success in decentralisation has, 
too, been oversimplified by the formal or legal processes of delegating 
an extensive amount of national authority to the local level. These 
perceived successes have concealed the insights that success in general 
elections had not led to democratic policy – making and that legal 
attribution to local authorities retained deep-seated conflict between 
national authorities and local counterparts.
As earlier sections of this article have demonstrated how the 
processes of democratisation and decentralisation in Indonesia have 
been moving back and forth for decades The changes that have 
taken place extensively during the post-Suharto era have created the 
slippery impression that Indonesia has undergone a fundamental 
process of democratisation and decentralisation.
The very foundation of Indonesia as a nation state made up of 
many culturally diverse nations has not been settled. Yet, it would 
see that the country has undergone liberalisation – which could 
essentially be considered as a transformation of the state itself. In a 
way, the liberally inspired transformation in Indonesia was inevitably 
triggered by the re-emergence of unsettled issues such as the ethnicity, 
secular vs. Islamic state, etc.
Cultural problems in bringing about those ideas stemmed 
from the fact that they were heavily loaded with contradicting 
values to settle. Moreover, the country has not been able to settle 
its foundation to govern the complexity within it. The process of 
nation building which President Sukarno started a long time ago 
was terminated involuntarily. That agenda fell down while President 
Suharto led the country. In the aftermath of Suharto’s presidency, 
the country was still unable to deal with the paramount problem 
in devising institutional devises to govern such a vast territory and 
cultural diversity. The cyclical appearance of issue of democratisation 
and decentralisation could be seen as being rooted in the inability 
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philosophy which has been passed down by the founder fathers – 
namely, to respect diversity at the same time as relying on a united 
system. In governing the country, Suharto gave heavy emphasis to 
unity due to his worries about the diversity he encountered. The 
current style of governance has overemphasised the diversity aspect, 
while having been troubled with maintaining unity.
The re-emergence of the issues of democratisation and 
decentralisation was triggered by the economic and political crises 
which forced President Suharto to step down. The crumble of 
legitimacy based on centralised rules during the crisis allowed for 
the enactment of a radical reform agenda. This was headlined by 
the political reformists’ success in achieving the enactment of Act 
No. 22 of 1999 on Local Government.  Despite the mounting 
euphoria at that time, this Act aimed to simply reverse the mode 
of governance institutionalised during more than three decade of 
Suharto presidency. It was dedicated to bringing about a radical 
political transformation through the dismantling of the previously 
centralistic form of governance and introduction of decentralised 
governance based on a liberal democratic setup.
Securing the process: Cross-cultural learning
The aforementioned description showed how democratisation 
and decentralisation has been treated merely as bureaucratic 
and technocratic matters. Moreover, a mere bureau-technocratic 
approach toward democracy and decentralisation was insufficient. 
The preponderance of that approach to duplicate the same mistake 
of neglecting and overlooking the cultural dimensions of Indonesian 
society was never very likely to bring us forward. 
The bureaucratic-technocratic approach placed the value of 
effectiveness and efficiency of democratisation and decentralisation 
as the main virtue. Translated into mere rules and procedures 
made by the experts among the state bureaucracy and universities, 
however, these rules and procedures have, in most cases, been found 
incompatible with the context and situation of where it has be 
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applied.23 It has been mostly due to the assumption that these rules 
and procedures would be surely compatible and applicable for all 
situations and contexts. 
This assumption, somehow, is an exaggeration and is a mistake 
that is repeatedly committed by the central government. It is a 
mistake because it is widely known and accepted that Indonesia is 
constituted by so many diverse groups and identities which overlap 
and cut across the different types of membership in society. Whether 
this fact, however, serves us, as an advantage or disadvantage for 
achieving our goal, depends on the perspective we use to see it. 
The dominant formalistic and legalistic perspective tends to see 
Indonesian diversity as a problem, or at least a barrier, in building a 
unified Indonesia.
We may see this as an inherent and logical consequence of the 
dominant bureaucratic-technocratic approach which views ‘politics’ 
and ‘the muddling through’ process of participation and deliberation 
as something at odds with the goals of effectiveness and efficiency. 
In this positivistic approach, politics should be reduced into merely 
technical and expertise matters.24 Thus, on the one hand, the currently 
dominant bureaucratic-technocratic perspective used in dealing 
with democratisation and decentralisation poses, somehow, a threat 
toward these very processes. On the other hand, it is acknowledged 
that the future of democratisation and decentralisation also depends 
on bureaucratic and technocratic arrangements and expertise.
23 Pratikno et.al. (eds.) 2004, Perjuangan Menuju Puncak: Perjuangan Menuju 
Puncak Kajian Akademis Pembentukan Kabupaten Puncak – Pemekaran 
Kabupaten Puncak Jaya Provinsi Papua, PLOD UGM and Regency 
Government of Puncak Jaya , Chapters one and two show good cases for how 
the procedures and rules for democratisation and decentralisation, specifically 
in the Formation of New Autonomous Region Policy, were found to be 
incompatible in some areas in Indonesia. The analysis in that book stated that 
to merely view and judge the policy through the lens of formal procedures and 
rules has made the government prone to overlooking the contextual needs and 
cultural dimension for the decentralisation policy, especially in presenting itself, 
in the form of public service, before the Indonesian people and citizens who 
live in remote isolated and border areas. In turn, this will bring consequences 
both for the citizens, having their rights for public service provided by the state 
denied, and for the state, the perennial threat of separatism in some areas of 
Indonesia.  
24 See also Fischer, Frank (1990) Technocracy and the Politics of Expertise, in Sage 
Publications: Calif . pp. 15-17.
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democracy and decentralisation in Indonesia, besides the 
conventional bureaucratic and formalistic perspectives. Through this 
perspective, various parties are encouraged to actively participate 
in the process of learning through intensive cultural encounters. It 
does not necessarily exclude the existing formal institutional and 
organisational arrangement; in fact, the encounter and learning 
processes are built based on and managed through the existing formal 
institutional arrangements.
Indonesian government and society needs to make a thorough 
reflection and evaluation on what they have achieved so far. It is 
imperative to make sure that the involved parties are themselves 
participating in these processes of cultural encounters and learning 
with the logic of accumulation, instead of distribution, in their mind. 
By keeping this logic in mind, the continuation of the unfinished 
process of Indonesian national building will be possible. Consequently, 
the decision to adopt this logical framework of accumulation should 
be complemented with the primacy of collective identity alongside 
the particular ones of religion, ethnicity, language, and culture.
The cultural encounters serve as a fora for various particular 
identities among Indonesian society to directly meet each other and 
get to know each other. Only from such an encounter it becomes 
possible for a multitude of Indonesians to continuously negotiate 
and build genuine understanding. It departs from the understanding 
that each particular identity should constitute the imagined 
communities of Indonesia. These particular identities are something 
with their own lives that have a living energy to act, react, and adapt 
to the environment they encounter, including other identities. Thus, 
genuine understanding should also incorporate understanding the 
dynamic potentials of these entities, instead of merely treating like 
some sort of relics from the past time displayed in a museum. 25 It 
25  A major example of how the New Order regime treated Indonesian diversity 
was in the most notorious project of Taman Mini Indonesia Indah. For further 
explanation of how this project was designed to treat Indonesia’s diverse 
identities as mere lifeless relics, see Dhakidae, Daniel (2007) Cendekiawan dan 
Kekuasaan di Masa Orde Baru, Gramedia: Jakarta.  
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is also noteworthy that most of these particular identities have been 
existed long before the establihment of Indonesia nation state , even 
before the coming of colonial powers.
Many of these centuries particular identities which comprise  the 
Indonesian identity have engaged and established themselves among 
other cultural entities worldwide. Through sea trade networks these 
identities and other encountered cultural entities, learning how to 
build shared understanding and also adapting themselves both to 
the other entities which they encountered but to also the changing 
environment. Lombard’s work of Nusa Jawa Silang Budaya and 
Reid’s The Lands Below the Winds have showed that various cultural 
entities in the islands of Nusantara have been long connected through 
various encounters, and each has been able to draw some lessons 
through these encounters.26 Since each of these cultural entities has 
drawn their own lessons and developed their own paths to adapt, it is 
not surprising if the effort to unify them has becomes laborious and 
without a proper approach, and hazardous with ethnic and religious 
conflicts since the fall of the New Order regime. 
Thus, it is necessary to give room and allow more opportunity 
for these diverse cultural entities and particular identities to express 
themselves in order to build genuine understanding. This is possible 
only if we are able to facilitate more encounters among these cultural 
entities and particular identities. Genuine encounters are not 
abstract discussions that occur in the court or meeting rooms at the 
parliament building, but the simple matters of everyday life. Another 
no-less-important task in facilitating these cultural encounters is to 
ensure they are manageable and lead to the desired goals. At this 
point collective identity plays a crucial role.    
26 Lombard’s work shows the case of Java and Javanese societies as a site and 
actor of this cultural engagement and learning, resulted Java and its societies 
as a cultural intersection, where the influence of various cultures gave color to 
what now known as Javanese culture. In this case, the Javanese still holds the 
control of what is considered appropriate and what is not from these strange 
cultures. They, however, acknowledge that such encounter is inevitable thus 
they adapt themselves to adapt as well to manage the occurred encounters and 
the influence coming from them. See, Lombar, Denys (2000) Nusa Jawa Silang 
Budaya,Vol 1, 2, 3; Winarsih P.A. et.al transl., P.T. Gramedia Pustaka Utama: 
Jakarta; first published 1996.
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diversity of Indonesian society. Previously, the common goals 
of gaining political freedom from Dutch colonial rule — though 
controversial — served as the main base of this collective identity. 
Post-independence development, however, has grown into situation 
in which the common goal has come into question, especially when 
considering the discrepancies between Java and outer-Java. The 
grim precedent of the imposition of a collective identity through 
modern development goals under the New Order regime which, 
unfortunately, were pursued more through coercive means, has 
embittered some Indonesians, especially those who live in Aceh, 
Papua, and several others regions with long histories of separatism. 
Their response toward collective identity has been mostly sceptical, 
for not to say totally distrustful. 
The New Order regime treated the diverse nature of Indonesian 
society mainly through manipulation, serving the dual goals of 
binding them in the chain of dependency to the central government 
at Jakarta and making them easy targets for political mobilisation 
to ensure the regime’s continued rule. Through such a policy, the 
previous regime produced a monopolar form of governance centred 
on Jakarta.27 Every idea about creating another centre was considered 
an act of disobedience or, worst, separatism, warranting an iron-fisted 
response from the centre. 
The demise of central government control after the fall of New 
Order regime witnessed the flourishing of long-oppressed expression 
from various particular identities and cultural entities, seeking to 
claim their rights. Unfortunately, in expressing their demands each 
these identities and cultural entities tended to target symbols which 
once represented the privileged ones during the New Order era. In 
most instances of conflict which escalated into violence, these symbols 
were attributed toward other particular identities or cultural entities. 
This phenomenon was mostly due to the previous New Order policy 
27 This pattern of mono-polarity is clearly seen in the flight route of almost all 
Indonesian major flight company. To reach one place, even one on the same 
island, people have to take the long route to Jakarta first, and then take another 
flight to the intended destination.
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that  focused on developing interaction and engagement between 
the groups and the central government instead of among themselves. 
Alongside the discriminative policy of the ruling regime which 
gave privilege to certain particular identities and cultural identities 
at the expense of other, the lack of communication, encounters, 
and understanding among these groups have created prejudice and 
stereotypes among them. Because of the lack of communication and 
encounters among members of each these group, such prejudice and 
stereotyping was accepted as being truthful and served as basis for 
group in referring to other. 
As mentioned before, in order to reverse this negative effect, 
it has been imperative to open wider room for engagement among 
these particular identities and cultural entities, framed in a collective 
identity of being Indonesian. This common identity must be based 
on a more relevant and commonly shared purpose and direction 
which would be available through the involvement of these particular 
identities and cultural entities in the bigger framework of Indonesia. 
Only after these pre-requirements of reflections, cultural 
engagement and collective identity have been met we may begin to 
build Indonesia in through a multipolar framework. This framework 
would place various overlapping and cross-cutting identities, 
constituted as the Indonesian identity, in a process of intensive 
mutual learning in order to build mutual understanding among the 
groups. To be cautious, it would be necessary to state in the first 
instance that this process required audacity, determination, as well 
as much heart from all the involved parties to keep work on this 
long quest for lasting mutual understanding among them. The 
logical fallacy of distribution and the impassionate response toward 
the accumulation process has resulted in the rocketing number of 
new autonomous regions in Indonesia within the past decade. Worse 
of all, the problems of logical fallacy and impassionate response 
from the particular elements of Indonesia go alongside the central 
government’s failure in wealth distribution. 
I acknowledge that such a multipolar mode of governance 
based on a accumulative logical framework would only be possible in 
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going forward. This vision, however, must be structurally shared and 
institutionalised and it must be done through a consensual process 
among particular identities and cultural entities which constitute 
Indonesia. One of the main roles of the leader here would be to 
facilitate the cultural encounters that make possible understanding 
and consensus building among these diverse groups.
Physical infrastructure would be most needed to allow for such 
cultural encounters to take place. The central government, for now, 
would be the only party who has the ability required for developing 
physical infrastructure to connect various parts of Indonesia, since 
such a project would require much planning capacity. Thus, the leader 
at the central government should make maximum contribution by 
gives their best on this task.28
Among the particular identities and cultural entities within 
society, such a vision and opportunity should be responded by 
developing their own institutional learning capacities. If during 
the previous regime they were demanded to merely obey, now each 
would be required to develop their capacity to learn, articulate, and 
negotiate their interests with other particular groups and the central 
government. 
In developing this organisational learning capacity, each 
particular group would need to, firstly, make a self-evaluation on 
what they have done so far and what they would do in the future. 
Through the cultural engagement this self-evaluation would be shared 
and communicated with other groups. The willingness to share and 
communicate would be crucial here, since only through this would it 
be possible for those groups to build a mutual understanding which 
could be transformed into further cooperation and inter-linkages. 
The government at every level should develop the same capacity 
and involve itself in the cultural engagement process. On the part of 
government, the organisational learning capacity could be translated 
28 At the provincial and local levels leadership at the Province of Kalimantan 
Tengah could be made as a good example. See 50 Tahun Kalimantan Tengah, 
Postgraduate Program for Political Science, Local Politics and Regional 
Autonomy, 2007.
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as the maximisation of research and developments (R&D) function 
within its structure. The government organisation running this 
function should become a reference in the policy-making process. 
Also important in such a process would be for each party to 
avoid the technocratic and positivistic traps. As mentioned earlier, the 
mistake previously made was in overlooking the cultural dimension 
of Indonesian society and its diversity, and was due to the reduction of 
Indonesian political and social phenomena into mere calculations of 
effectiveness and efficiency. In this cultural perspective, the historical 
path becomes one of the determining factors for what would happen 
in the future. 
In this process of self-reflection and evaluation, and 
communication with other parties, inevitably there must be some 
things that would be unpleasant or share with others. The parties 
involved, however, should deal with such cases with open mindedness 
– truth, however bitter, would always be better than falsity. Indonesian 
historiography could serve as a good example. As recently revealed, 
Indonesian history has had many missing links which need thorough 
research in order to gain a clearer picture. This has been partly due to 
the previous regime’s policy of manipulating history to legitimise its 
rule. This manipulated history has been reproduced over the span of 
decades, and has been deeply rooted in the mind of most Indonesian 
and accepted as nearly undeniable truth. People’s understanding of 
history gives influence to how he/she understands and responds to 
their current situation. If one responds to his current situation based 
on a manipulated history, inevitably they would be prone to arriving 
at the wrong decision that could lead to unintended consequences. 
One first important step toward gaining clearer view of our history 
would be through opening up ‘the other stories’ to reveal the truth 
other those that have been imposed. 
In managing the diversity of Indonesian society through this 
cultural perspective, the state should not co-opt various entities, 
including religious organisations. Instead, the state should facilitate 
the engagement among these entities, and more than merely through 
a consociational model of representation. The state should also 
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it possible for them to know each other better and to take on board 
the lessons of such encounters.
In the governance context, this organisational learning capacity 
should at least include two components – political learning and policy 
learning. Policy learning itself includes the so-called instrumental 
learning and social learning.29 Political learning capacity would 
provide the involved parties the tools to understand the contextual 
dimension of their existence and then relate their ideas with the 
existing context. This capacity would help them to determine their 
strategy in order to promote their ideas or respond to the policy 
problems they encountered. For the various groups within society 
this capacity would be useful in articulating and promoting their 
ideas in the agenda-setting process. For the government, this capacity 
would serve in guiding it to formulate the relevant policies to frame 
the diversity of Indonesian society in a unifying and more democratic 
manner. 
Policy learning would consist of two components – the social 
learning capacity and instrumental learning capacity. Social learning 
capacity is related to the ability to understand the social construction 
of any given policy. It would give the involved parties sensitivity 
toward the values and norms pursued through any given policy. 
Instrumental learning capacity would give the involved parties more 
options and alternatives on possible measures of policy intervention 
or implementation designs. 
The case of Yogyakarta, which has succeeded in maintaining its 
status as the capital for Javanese culture and, at the same time, the 
weaver of unity for Indonesia, could be seen as a best practice case. The 
city’s political learning capacity has enabled her to see and understand 
the political propensity which favoured the establishment of a nation 
state. In order to maintain its existence in this new situation, the 
correct response has been forthcoming from the old institution of the 
Sultanate. Instead of simply being a spectator in the establishment 
29 May, Peter J., Policy Learning and Failure; Journal of Public Policy part 4, 1992, 
pp. 331-354. 
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and institutionalisation of the nation state, the Sultanate under the 
visionary leadership of Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX has played an 
active role in the process since the very beginning. Firstly, during 
harsh times the Sultan offered Yogyakarta as the capital city of the 
newly born republic even though this meant putting the city at risk 
of becoming a military target of the returning Dutch forces. This 
decision proved the Sultanate’s commitment toward the establishment 
of the new Republic of Indonesia, and toward its ongoing existence.
Secondly, considering the inevitable interaction with modernity, 
the Sultanate quickly responded by handing over some of his estate for 
the establishment of the first university of the independent Indonesia 
– Gadjah Mada University. Through this university, the Sultanate 
has played the role as one of the main weavers of Indonesian unity. 
Students of this university come from all over Indonesia, brining their 
own cultures, customs, languages, values, and norms. As a result, 
Yogyakarta has been dubbed ‘Indonesia Mini’. In contrast to the 
Taman Mini Indonesia Indah park in Jakarta, the ‘Indonesia Mini’ 
has positive associations because of the respect for diversity — in its 
living form in — Yogyakarta. In this continued peaceful interaction, 
there must be moments where each participant has to learn about 
each other and, from there, they build mutual understandings. The 
beautiful diversity and harmonious interactions and relationships 
among various particular identities and cultural entities in Yogyakarta 
are the paramount of the continuous effort of cultural learning 
through daily cultural encounters of its participants.
The case of Yogyakarta is an example of successful cultural 
encounters and learning. The process produces a sense of pride 
toward Indonesia’s cultural diversity, without the impostion of 
neglect toward the particular identities of each participant. Thus, my 
particular identity as Muslim or Christian or Javanese or Papuan does 
not stand against my identity as an Indonesian. Instead, my identity 
as an Indonesian enables me to express my particular identities 
stronger because each of them is one of parts that constitute the 
Indonesian identity. 
The explanation above deals with how the cultural encounter 
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and mostly through informal channels. For this scheme to work, a 
parallel effort must be made at the governmental level, in its broad 
sense, and through formal channels. The Regional Representative 
Council (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, DPD) could serve the cause of 
weaving Indonesian unity through its diversity.
As we know, the DPD is a national body in which most of its 
members come from across Indonesia. Their function is to represent 
regional and local interests at the national level. In order to maximise 
the DPD’s function, it would be necessary to facilitate this body and 
its members to be better-rooted with its constituents at the local level 
and in maintaining engagement with members representing other 
localities. Through this there would be a well-connected chain of 
representation in which the populace from various localities would 
have access to the policy-making process at national level. This formal 
channel would help maintain the cultural encounters and learning 
for better mutual understanding.
Conclusion
No matter what the prevailing external interests are in Indonesia, 
decentralised democracy in Indonesia highly needs its people. 
The predominating streams of thought which guide the process of 
democratisation and decentralisation in the country misjudge the 
importance and the role of culture. Examining the way in which the 
transformation has occurred in Indonesia reveals that culture has been 
perceived more as a burden rather than as a helper in the processes 
of democratisation and decentralisation. This tendency turns out 
to be one of the major causes why Indonesia has its progress in 
decentralization and democratization halted due to its unwillingness 
to engage in a critical evaluation and honest self-reflection.
Indonesia’s ability to make a sufficient response to globalisation 
requires the completion of the forgotten agenda – establishing 
Indonesia as a strong  nation-state on which cultural diversity serves 
as its strength, rather than its weakness. Indonesia needs to make sure 
that it manages to establish a democratic and decentralised political 
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structure based on cultural features, although the importance of 
putting universal values in place does not necessarily imply to 
disregard local cultures.
Indonesia’s ability to do so depends on a double-edged strategy. 
On the one hand, it needs to reshape the prevailing cultural lens of 
the public so that it is sensitive in identifying the root causes and 
superficial causes of social problems. On the other hand, it has to 
make sure that the reshaped lens equips the members of the public 
with the capacity to learn from each other and from their past. 
Beneath the dynamics of the cultural transformation, a silent and 
salient process of learning should take place. Yet, what we require is 
not merely the adoption of what has been established elsewhere in 
other contexts.
There must also be a process of creation and, in some cases, co-
creation. Various ideas and aspiration circulated within the discourse 
and practices of cosmopolitan democracy serve as either common 
points of reference or as threats to challenge. Willingness to learn 
allows the creation of capability to make a critical understanding, and 
allows us to come up with entirely new things that don’t necessarily 
fall under the conflicting dichotomy. While open mindedness 
is important, this approach will not in anyway have any logical 
reason to suppose that “we will be able to control the outcomes 
of our creations and activities”.30 Mobilising collective capacity to 
learn is the only hope left, since the norm of interdependence in 
this globaliaed world requires our willingness to accept the indirect 
effects of other’s activities.*
30 Jim Whitman, The Limits of Global Governance, Routledge, London, 2005, 
page. 114.
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